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This chapter examines philosophical issues surrounding the classification of mental disorders by 
the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM). In particular, the chapter 
focuses on issues concerning the relative merits of descriptive versus theoretical approaches to 
psychiatric classification and whether the DSM should classify natural kinds. These issues are 
presented with reference to the history of the DSM, which has been published regularly by the 
American Psychiatric Association since 1952 and is currently in its fifth edition. While the first 
two editions of the DSM adopted a theoretical (psychoanalytic) and etiological approach to 
classification, subsequent editions of the DSM have adopted an atheoretical and purely 
descriptive (“neo-Kraepelinian”) approach. It is argued that largest problem with the DSM at 
present—viz., its failure to provide valid diagnostic categories—is directly related to the purely 
descriptive methodology championed by the DSM since the third edition of the DSM. In light of 
this problem, the chapter discusses the prospects of a theoretical and causal approach to 
psychiatric classification and critically examines the assumption that the DSM should classify 
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What is the purpose of classifying mental disorders? When should we regard a system of 
psychiatric classification as being successful? What kind of methodology should a system of 
psychiatric classification adopt? What are the relative benefits of descriptive as opposed to 
theoretical approaches to psychiatric classification? Should the DSM classify natural kinds? This 
chapter addresses these interrelated questions by critically examining the Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM), which has been published regularly by the 
American Psychiatric Association since 1952 and is currently the most influential psychiatric 
classification system in the United States. While no definitive answers to these questions will be 
reached, my analysis aims to elucidate some of the philosophical considerations involved in 
assessing the DSM. 
This chapter focuses on philosophical issues concerning the appropriate methodology for 
classifying mental disorders and whether the DSM should classify natural kinds. The chapter 
proceeds as follows. After briefly examining the history of the DSM and its adoption of a purely 
descriptive approach to classification in DSM-III (APA 1980), the explicit aims of the DSM (i.e., 
guiding treatment, facilitating research, and improving communication) are examined as a 
reference point for assessing the DSM. It is argued that the DSM is currently failing to meet its 
own aims, largely because of its failure to provide valid diagnostic categories (i.e., definitions 
that map onto real disorders in nature). As a potential solution to this problem, the prospects of a 
theoretical and causal approach to psychiatric classification are considered as an alternative to 
the DSM’s purely descriptive approach. As a more fundamental and general philosophical issue 
concerning psychiatric classification, the question of whether the DSM is able to classify natural 




A Brief History of the DSM 
Before addressing philosophical questions regarding how mental disorders should be classified, 
it is important to examine some of the historical factors that have shaped the DSM. Prior to the 
publication of the DSM, the first standardized psychiatric classification manual published in the 
United States was the Statistical Manual for the Use of Institutions for the Insane (American 
Medico-Psychological Association and National Committee for Mental Hygiene 1918). The 
Statistical Manual was the definitive classification manual for mental disorders during the 
interwar years and it went through ten editions from 1918 to 1942. This manual was primarily 
intended for the collection of institutional data among inpatient mental hospitals and it implicitly 
assumed that mental disorders were biological disorders (Grob 1991b). After World War II, it 
was apparent that the Statistical Manual was insufficient to accommodate the types of patients 
that military psychiatrists treated during the war, the psychosocial problems that patients 
presented in outpatient settings, and the psychoanalytic assumptions that were increasingly 
becoming entrenched in early 20th century psychiatry (Horwitz 2015). These limitations of the 
Statistical Manual provided the impetus for a new system of psychiatric classification. 
The first two editions of the DSM (APA 1952, 1968) classified mental disorders in a 
theoretical and etiological manner. Mental disorders were classified in a theoretical manner 
insofar as the disorders listed in these manuals were strongly informed by Sigmund Freud’s 
psychoanalytic theory, which emphasized unconscious conflicts that contributed to mental 
illness, as well as Adolf Meyer’s life-course approach to psychiatry, which emphasized how 
mental illnesses were reactions that individuals experienced in response to their environments 
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(Horwitz 2015; cf. Cooper and Blashfield 2016). DSM-I and DSM-II classified disorders in an 
etiological manner insofar as the causes of disorders were often indicated, either in the name of 
the disorder or in the general class in which the disorder was classified. A fundamental 
classificatory distinction in the first two editions of the DSM was a distinction between disorders 
with biological causes and disorders with psychological causes (Tsou 2011). In DSM-I, this 
distinction was captured in the general classificatory distinction between “disorders caused by or 
associated with impairment of brain tissue function” (APA 1952: 2) and “disorders of 
psychogenic origin without clearly defined physical cause or structural change in the brain” 
(APA 1952: 5). In DSM-II, this general etiological distinction was preserved under the new 
terms “organic brain syndromes” and “functional disorders” (APA 1968: 123). 
 The third edition of the DSM (APA 1980) marked a “revolution” in psychiatric 
classification in its explicit replacement of the theoretical and etiological approach adopted in 
DSM-I and DSM-III with an atheoretical and descriptive approach. In the introduction of DSM-
III, the new approach to classification was described as follows: 
The approach taken in DSM-III is atheoretical with regard to etiology . . . except for 
those disorders for which this is well established . . . The major justification for the 
generally atheoretical approach . . . is that the inclusion of etiological theories would be 
an obstacle to use of the manual by clinicians of varying theoretical orientations . . . 
Because DSM-III is generally atheoretical with regard to etiology, it attempts to describe 
comprehensively what the manifestations of the mental disorders are, and only rarely 
attempts to account for how the disturbances come about . . . This approach can be said to 
be ‘descriptive’ in that the definitions of the disorders generally consist of descriptions of 
the clinical features of the disorders. . . . at the lowest order of inference necessary to 
describe the characteristic features of the disorder. (APA 1980: 7)  
This shift to a purely descriptive approach to classification was signified most prominently by 
the introduction of the now familiar “diagnostic criteria” in DSM-III, wherein individuals need to 
satisfy a set of necessary and sufficient criteria (mainly behavioral or otherwise observable 
criteria) in order to receive a DSM diagnosis. DSM-III and its successors also removed 
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references to the causes of disorders and theoretical assumptions (viz., psychoanalytic 
assumptions) were excluded from the language of the manual. From a scientific point of view, 
DSM-III was heralded as a great success because its introduction of diagnostic criteria provided 
reliable diagnostic categories that different users could apply in a consistent manner. DSM-III 
was also successful in ensuring that the manual could be widely used by mental health 
professionals endorsing disparate theoretical assumptions. In this regard, it is not an accident that 
the DSM only became an influential and increasingly entrenched manual after DSM-III (Hacking 
2013). 
From a historical point of view, there are several factors responsible for the DSM’s shift 
to an atheoretical and descriptive approach to classification. On a general level, one of the most 
important factors was the declining status, in the 1970s, of the psychoanalytic approach to 
psychiatry, which had informed the definitions of DSM-I and DSM-II. While psychoanalysis 
enjoyed a period of dominance in the United States from the post-war period to the early 1960s 
(Grob 1991b; Wilson 1993; Hale 1995), its scientific legitimacy was increasingly called into 
question after the 1960s (e.g., see Szasz 1961; Foucault 1965). Moreover, the introduction of the 
first antipsychotic drug in the 1950s led to a mass deinstitutionalization of mental patients 
insofar as treated patients no longer needed to be confined to asylums and could live in 
community settings (Grob 1991a, 1995). The deinstitutionalization of mental patients and 
increasing use of pharmacological drugs to treat mental disorders (e.g., schizophrenia, bipolar 
disorder, depression) in the 1960s and 1970s highlighted the inability of psychoanalytic methods 
to treat more serious disorders (Mayes and Horwitz 2005). In the 1970s, the DSM was also 
facing criticism from third-party insurance companies, who demanded clarity in psychiatric 
diagnoses and accountability for treatment outcomes (Horwitz 2002: ch. 3). By the mid-1970s, 
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insurance companies such as Blue Cross and Aetna cut financial support for psychotherapy, 
citing lack of clarify and uniformity of diagnoses of mental disorders (Wilson 1993). As such, 
the psychoanalytically informed diagnostic categories of DSM-II were failing to meet third-party 
insurance companies’ need for clear and standardized psychiatric diagnoses.  
On a more specific level, the most decisive factor in the shift to a purely descriptive 
approach to classification was the “neo-Kraepelinian” outlook of the taskforce responsible for 
revising DSM-III. In 1974, Robert L. Spitzer was appointed to chair the DSM-III taskforce and 
he selected a number of like-minded individuals—with whom he had close professional 
allegiances—to join the taskforce (Blashfield 1984). In particular, Spitzer had close ties to a 
research group at Washington University in St. Louis who developed the “Feighner criteria”: a 
set of diagnostic criteria for fifteen mental disorders, which effectively served as prototypes for 
DSM-III diagnostic categories (Feighner et al. 1972). Spitzer’s taskforce shared a neo-
Kraepelinian outlook on psychiatric classification insofar as they followed the tradition of 
psychiatry associated with Emil Kraepelin, who advocated a system of biological psychiatry that 
competed with Freudian psychoanalysis in the early-twentieth century. Whereas psychoanalysts 
assumed that psychological mechanisms play a key role in mental illness and the boundary 
between normality and abnormality is continuous (ranging from neuroses to psychoses), the neo-
Kraepelinians assumed that mental illnesses are discrete biological diseases and there is a clear 
boundary between the normal and the sick (Klerman 1974; Blashfield 1984; Wilson 1993). From 
the neo-Kraepelinian perspective, it was crucial to distinguish the mentally ill from the well with 
reliable and valid diagnostic categories. The desideratum for empirically validated diagnostic 
categories motived the neo-Kraepelinian belief that mental disorders ought to be classified on the 
basis of their observable symptoms, rather than on the basis of speculative inferences regarding 
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their causes. This methodological stance constituted the foundation for the purely descriptive 
approach adopted in DSM-III. Since the publication of DSM-III, the purely descriptive, neo-
Kraepelinian methodology has remained the status quo in subsequent editions of the DSM.  
 
Aims of the DSM 
In the introduction to the fourth edition of the DSM, one finds one of the most explicit and 
clearest statements of the goals of the DSM: 
The utility and credibility of DSM-IV require that it focus on its clinical, research, and 
educational purposes and be supported by an extensive empirical foundation. Our highest 
priority has been to provide a helpful guide to clinical practice. . . . An additional goal 
was to facilitate research and improve communication among clinicians and researchers. 
We were also mindful of the use of the DSM-IV for improving the collection of clinical 
information and as an educational tool for teaching psychopathology. (APA 2000: xxiii, 
emphasis added; cf. APA 2013: xli)   
As suggested here, the main aims of the DSM are to: (1) provide a manual that can guide 
treatment decisions, (2) facilitate research, and (3) improve communication among mental health 
professionals. These explicitly cited aims of the DSM present a reasonable starting point for 
evaluating the DSM as a psychiatric classification manual. 
 How well does the DSM do in meeting these three aims of the DSM? As indicated above, 
the DSM states that its primary goal is to provide a helpful guide in clinical and treatment 
contexts. Unfortunately, there is evidence that the DSM does not fare very well on this particular 
goal. While DSM-III was successful in providing reliable diagnostic categories that can be 
applied uniformly by clinicians working in different treatment contexts, there is little evidence 
that the DSM’s fine-grained diagnostic categories are actually useful for clinicians in guiding 
treatment decisions. In clinical contexts, a DSM diagnosis is necessary for patients seeking 
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treatment to be reimbursed for services. Research has indicated that clinicians using the DSM 
frequently deliberately give inaccurate diagnoses to patients, e.g., giving a less severe diagnosis 
to avoid the stigmatizing effects of diagnostic labels or providing a diagnosis so that clients can 
receive reimbursement for treatment services (Kirk and Kutchins 1988, 1992: ch. 9). Others have 
discussed the “sociological ambivalence” experienced by clinicians (Brown 1987; Whooley 
2010), in which the demands placed on clinicians by the DSM conflict with their desire to 
exercise individual professional autonomy in helping individuals seeking treatment. This leads to 
situations where clinicians will intentionally fudge DSM codes provided on insurance forms, or 
negotiate diagnoses with clients (Whooley 2010). These kinds of practices fall well short of the 
diagnosis-treatment model implicitly assumed in the DSM, wherein clinicians diagnose patients 
with a DSM category and provide a treatment plan on the basis of the diagnosis. In addition to 
intentional misdiagnoses, a well-known difficulty with the DSM in practice is the high incidence 
of comorbid diagnoses (Kessler et al. 2005), which undermines the entire rationale of the 
diagnosis-treatment model. In actual clinical practices, one of the most useful DSM tools is the 
“not otherwise specified” (NOS) code, which indicates that a patient does not fit neatly into any 
of the DSM’s diagnostic categories, but allows individuals to receive a DSM diagnosis for the 
purposes of medical insurance (Hyman 2010). Hence, in clinical contexts, the DSM appears to 
function as an administrative constraint, rather than as a helpful guide for clinical practice and 
treatment decisions.  
 There are also reasons for thinking that the DSM is not particularly useful—and perhaps 
an impediment—for facilitating research on mental disorders. The DSM and its diagnostic 
categories currently guide research by providing operational definitions of mental disorders, 
which researchers utilize to select homogenous populations of patients to study. While this 
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strategy is useful for ensuring that researchers working in different locales are studying disorders 
in a uniform manner, a fundamental flaw with this research strategy stems from the fact that 
while DSM categories are reliable, they lack validity in the sense that we have no assurance that 
DSM diagnostic categories map onto discrete mental disorders in reality (Kendell 1989; Kendell 
and Jablensky 2003). This presents a situation where the DSM may function to reify 
operationally defined categories that do not have any basis in reality (Hyman 2010). Frustration 
with the lack of validity of DSM categories has led the National Institute of Mental Health to 
develop the Research Domain Criteria (RDoC), which is an alternative psychiatric classification 
system intended primarily for research on psychopathology. One of the motivations of the RDoC 
was to counter the problem that DSM categories do not correspond well to emerging findings 
from genetics, behavioral science, and neuroscience (Hyman 2007; Sanislow et al. 2010; 
Cuthbert and Insel 2013). The RDoC is premised on the idea that shifting research away from the 
DSM’s operational definitions will provide a more fruitful approach for identifying valid 
diagnostic categories (or constructs). Rather than studying psychopathology by focusing on the 
specific symptom-based definitions of mental disorders provided by the DSM, the RDoC 
attempts to direct research on psychopathology towards more general constructs (e.g., potential 
threat, reward learning, cognitive control) that are more likely to be explicable at lower levels of 
analysis (e.g., genes, neural circuits, physiology), and hence serve as more promising targets of 
validation than DSM definitions (Tabb 2015; Bluhm 2017).  
 While the DSM is not highly successful at guiding clinical treatment or facilitating 
research, it does undoubtedly improve communication among different mental health 
professionals. The DSM achieves this aim through its provision of standardized operational 
definitions of mental disorders, which can be used in a variety of different contexts, including 
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contexts related to treatment and research. Relatedly, DSM definitions of mental disorders can be 
widely used by a variety of different users since DSM definitions make no strong theoretical or 
metaphysical assumptions about the nature or causes of mental disorders. Hence, the DSM helps 
to standardize and coordinate communication about psychopathology through its provision of a 
common language for talking about mental disorders. While this benefit of the DSM should not 
be underestimated, this virtue needs to be balanced against the lack of validity of DSM 
definitions. If DSM categories are not successfully individuating real disorders in nature, then 
the benefit of communicating in the language of DSM categories may not be a substantial 
benefit, but a drawback.  
 
Descriptive vs. Theoretical Approaches 
Given the explicitly stated aims of the DSM (i.e., guiding treatment, facilitating research, and 
improving communication), what is an effective methodology for achieving these goals? As 
indicated above, the purely descriptive, neo-Kraepelinian methodology adopted by the DSM 
since DSM-III has failed to satisfactorily meet the DSM’s goals, with exception of improving 
communication among different mental health professionals. The failure of the DSM to provide a 
useful manual for informing treatment decisions and for facilitating research stems largely from 
the inability of the DSM to identify valid diagnostic categories.  
 Several philosophers of science have argued in favor of a theoretical and causal approach 
to psychiatric classification. In his classic analysis of psychiatric taxonomy, Carl Hempel (1965) 
argued that a good taxonomic system in psychiatry must not only reliably describe its objects of 
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classification, but it should also facilitate the simultaneous formulation of scientific theories and 
laws: 
[G]ranting some oversimplification, the development of a scientific discipline may often 
be said to proceed from an initial “natural history” stage, which primarily seeks to 
describe the phenomena under study and to establish simple empirical generalizations 
concerning them, to subsequent more and more ‘theoretical’ stages, in which increasing 
emphasis is placed upon the attainment of comprehensive theoretical accounts of the 
empirical subject matter under investigation. (Hempel 1965: 140, emphasis added) 
According to Hempel, the classificatory concepts of taxonomic systems serve two main 
epistemic functions: (1) description, and (2) explanation. With respect to the descriptive function 
of classificatory concepts, Hempel recommends the usage of operational definitions to 
objectively define its objects of classification. While Hempel would have approved of the DSM’s 
introduction of operational definitions in DSM-III, he would also maintain that for a taxonomic 
system to achieve a truly scientific status, it must move beyond this descriptive stage into 
increasingly theoretical stages. With respect to the explanatory function of classificatory 
concepts, Hempel recommends that concepts should be located within a broader theoretical 
framework that provides a systematic way for organizing the subclasses of that system. For this 
end, Hempel (1965) recommends the formulation of general laws and theoretical principles: 
[T]o be scientifically useful a concept must lend itself to the formulation of general laws 
or theoretical principles which reflect uniformities in the subject matter under study, and 
which thus provides a basis for explanation, prediction, and generally scientific 
understanding. (146, emphasis added) 
Hempel argues that psychiatric classification systems ought to reach a theoretical stage because 
this will ensure that its classificatory concepts are explanatory and predictive. From Hempel’s 
perspective, if a classification system is to provide projectable inferences (i.e., reliable 
predictions) about its objects of classification (e.g., inferences regarding the prognosis of a 
disorder, or which treatment interventions might be successful), its concepts should be associated 
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with scientific theories or laws (e.g., psychoanalytic or physiological theories), which make 
explicit hypotheses regarding the causes of the disorders.  
 More recently, Dominic Murphy (2006) and Jonathan Tsou (2015, 2016) have argued 
that a theoretical and causal approach to psychiatric classification based on biological psychiatry 
would offer a more promising method for classifying mental disorders than the purely 
descriptive approach currently favored by the DSM. Murphy (2006) argues that the DSM’s 
purely descriptive system of classification is incoherent in its application of the medical model. 
While the DSM implicitly assumes that mental disorders are distinct (disease) entities that reflect 
underlying causal differences, it prohibits reference to the causal processes and dysfunctions that 
distinguish them. Hence, the DSM’s purely descriptive approach to classification provides an 
impoverished (or incoherent) method for individuating mental disorders that are assumed to be 
causally distinctive diseases. Murphy also maintains that the DSM’s symptom-based approach to 
classification fails to distinguish heterogeneous conditions since DSM categories group together 
different symptom profiles as manifestations of the same disorder. In place of the DSM’s neo-
Kraepelinian approach, Murphy advocates a theoretical and causal approach to classification that 
supplements the descriptive categories of the DSM with causal information concerning the 
determinants of various symptoms. As Murphy (2006) puts it, “[by] articulating causal 
explanations . . . , the hope is that we will eventually be able [to] discriminate more finely among 
conditions that are currently lumped together by DSM’s fuzzy categories, by distinguishing 
syndromes on the basis of etiology and pathology” (349–50). Similarly, Tsou (2015, 2016) 
argues that one of the main deficits of the DSM’s purely descriptive approach is that it fails to 
facilitate a testable and revisable system of classification and the DSM has functioned to reify 
and entrench artificial kinds of mental disorders (e.g., histrionic personality disorder). If the 
13 
 
DSM aims to classify naturally occurring kinds of mental disorders (i.e., natural kinds), Tsou 
(2015, 2016) argues that diagnostic categories should integrate causal information such that the 
operational criteria that are used to define mental disorders are associated (or hypothesized to be 
associated) with identifiable biological mechanisms (e.g., neurobiological mechanisms). Tsou 
argues that, compared to the DSM’s purely descriptive approach, a theoretical and causal 
approach to classification would provide a superior and more transparent methodology for 
identifying valid diagnostic categories and meeting the DSM’s goals (especially the goals of 
guiding treatment and facilitating research). 
 Disenchantment with the failure of the DSM to identify valid diagnostic categories has 
also led some mental health researchers to advocate a theoretical approach to psychiatric 
classification. Prior to the publication of DSM-5, some members of the DSM-5 taskforce—led 
by David J. Kupfer—indicated that DSM-5 would mark a shift towards a theoretical approach to 
classification informed by sciences such as genetics, neuroscience, and the cognitive sciences 
(e.g., see Kupfer, First, and Regier 2002; Hyman 2007; Regier 2008; Regier et al. 2009; Kupfer 
and Regier 2011; Kupfer, Kuhl, and Regier 2013). For example, Kupfer, First, and Regier (2002) 
discuss the “[n]eed to explore the possibility of fundamental changes in the neo-Kraepelinian 
diagnostic paradigm” (xviii) and the potential of the DSM-5 to usher a paradigm-shift towards a 
theoretical approach to psychiatric classification: 
 Concerns have . . . been raised that researchers’ slavish adoption of DSM-IV definitions  
may have hindered research in the etiology of mental disorders. Few question the value  
of having a well-described, well-operationalized, and universally accepted diagnostic  
system to facilitate diagnostic comparisons across studies and to improve diagnostic  
reliability. However, reification of DSM-IV entities, to the point that they are considered 
to be equivalent to diseases, is more likely to obscure than to elucidate research findings. 
All these limitations in the current [neo-Kraepelinian] diagnostic paradigm 
suggest that research exclusively focused on refining the DSM-defined syndromes may 
never be successful in uncovering their underlying etiologies. For that to happen, an as 
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yet unknown paradigm shift may need to occur. Therefore, another important goal . . . is 
to transcend the limitations of the current DSM paradigm and to encourage a research 
agenda that goes beyond our current ways of thinking to attempt to integrate information 
from a wide variety of sources and technologies. (xix) 
 
The eventual publication of DSM-5 (APA 2013) was disappointing for those hoping for 
revisions of paradigm-shifting proportions; the main discernible methodological difference in 
DSM-5 compared to its predecessors is the greater use of dimensional measures. 
As discussed earlier, the repeated failure of the DSM to identify valid diagnostic 
categories also spurned the National Institute of Mental Health to introduce the Research 
Domain Criteria (RDoC) project, which supports an explicitly theoretical approach to psychiatric 
classification intended primarily for facilitating research on psychopathology (Insel et al. 2010; 
Casey et al. 2013; Cuthbert and Insel 2013; Cuthbert 2014). A large part of RDoC project is the 
RDoC matrix (Morris and Cuthbert 2012: 31), which seeks to organize and facilitate 
psychopathology research by distinguishing seven units of analysis (viz., genes, molecules, cells, 
circuits, physiology, behavior, self-report, and paradigms) and five research domains (viz., 
negative valence emotional systems, positive valence emotional systems, cognitive systems, 
social processes, and arousal/ regulatory systems). The RDoC matrix offers an alternative 
classification system to the DSM for research purposes, and it is premised on the idea that 
research exclusively framed in terms of DSM categories are inadequate for formulating valid 
diagnostic categories (Insel et al. 2010; Cuthbert and Insel 2013). 
Despite these various arguments for a theoretical and causal approach to psychiatric 
classification by philosophers of science and practicing mental health researchers, the DSM has 
upheld its purely descriptive, neo-Kraepelinian approach to classification. Proponents of the 
DSM’s purely descriptive approach have emphasized the need to be conservative in revising the 
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DSM (Frances 2009; Frances and Widiger 2012); while others have stressed that the DSM is not 
prepared for full-scale revolutionary changes to its methodology (Kendler and First 2010).  
 
Can the DSM Classify Natural Kinds? 
 
Some commentators on psychiatric classification have argued that the proper objects or targets of 
psychiatric classification are natural kinds, i.e., classes of mental disorders that have a shared 
natural basis (e.g., Tsou 2016). In philosophy of science, natural kinds (e.g., H20, electrons, 
quarks) are understood as classes or groupings that accurately correspond to the natural structure 
of the world, whereas artificial kinds (e.g., chairs, books, games) are classes that reflect the 
interests and actions of humans (Bird and Tobin 2017). Hence, natural kinds are thought to be 
naturally occurring (‘real’) classes that are the proper objects of scientific study; artificial kinds 
are arbitrary or invented classes that may serve some social function, but do not have a natural 
basis. Several philosophers of science have offered reasons for thinking that the DSM is unable 
to classify natural kinds.  
 While there is no agreement on what natural kinds in psychiatry are (e.g., see Zachar 
2000; Haslam 2002; Cooper 2005, 2007; Beebee and Sabbarton-Leary 2010; Samuels 2009; 
Kendler, Zachar, and Craver 2011; Tsou 2013, 2016; Kincaid and Sullivan 2014), mental 
disorders that are natural kinds are generally conceptualized as classes of abnormal behavior that 
have a clear natural (as opposed to artificial) basis. With respect to human science classifications, 
some classifications (e.g., “introversion,” “Hodgkin’s Lymphoma,” “Down syndrome”) refer to 
natural kinds insofar as these classes can be defined with reference to a set of natural (i.e., 
biological) properties; other classes (e.g., “widows,” “liberals,” “policemen”) refer to artificial 
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kinds insofar as these classes are defined exclusively in terms of a set of conventionally defined 
(i.e., social) properties. While most mental disorders listed in the DSM include conventional 
aspects, it is reasonable to assume that some of them are “more natural” insofar as these 
classes—to a large extent—can be individuated with reference to a set of natural properties. For 
example, forms of schizophrenia that include psychotic elements (i.e., auditory hallucinations 
and delusions) can be defined with reference to identifiable dysfunctional neurobiological 
processes, such as excessive dopamine activity in the mesolimbic pathway (see Tsou 2012). 
 An implicit goal of the DSM since the publication of DSM-III is that the manual should 
classify mental disorders that are natural kinds. Prior to the publication of DSM-III, the authors 
of DSM-III planned to include a statement in the manual indicating that the mental disorders 
listed in the DSM are “a subset of medical conditions” (Spitzer, Sheehy, and Endicott 1977; 
Spitzer and Endicott 1978), which suggests that the DSM aims to classify natural kinds (viz., 
naturally occurring disease entities). This statement, however, was ultimately not included in 
DSM-III due to protests by psychologists, social workers, and counsellors, who regarded this 
statement as a declaration that psychiatrists with medical training were solely responsible for the 
treatment of mental disorders (Mayes and Horwitz 2005). The general definition of mental 
disorder presented in DSM-5 also indicates that the DSM aims to classify natural kinds: “A 
mental disorder is a syndrome characterized by clinically significant disturbance in an 
individual’s cognition, emotion regulation, or behavior that reflects a dysfunction in the 
psychological, biological, or developmental processes underlying mental functioning” (APA 
2013: 20, emphasis added; cf. APA 2000: xxxi). This definition indicates that the mental 
disorders classified by the DSM are natural kinds insofar as these disorders are caused by a 
dysfunction in some naturalistic (i.e., psychological, biological, or developmental) process. 
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Significantly, classes of abnormal behavior that merely deviate from social norms—as opposed 
to naturalistic norms—are explicitly excluded from this definition of mental disorder (APA 
2013: 20).  
 Ian Hacking has offered an influential argument for thinking that the DSM cannot 
classify natural kinds. Hacking (1999) argues that—in contrast to the stable objects of 
classification in the natural sciences (e.g., electrons, quarks)—the objects of classification in 
psychiatry (and the human sciences more generally) are inherently unstable because of the 
“looping effects” of psychiatric classifications. Looping effects are social feedback effects of 
human science classifications, wherein individuals who are classified change in response to how 
they are classified, e.g., children who are diagnosed with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity 
Disorder act in accordance with the stereotypes associated with this label (Hacking 1995). 
According to Hacking, looping effects are specific to human science classifications because the 
objects of classification in the human sciences (unlike the objects of classification in the natural 
sciences) are aware of how they are classified and will change in response to how they are 
classified. Hacking (2007) writes: 
We think of . . . kinds of people [e.g., obese people or impoverished people] . . . as 
definite classes defined by definite properties. . . . But it is not quite like that. They are 
moving targets because our investigations interact with the targets themselves, and 
change them. And since they are changed, they are not quite the same kind of people as 
before. The target has moved. That is the looping effect. (293)  
According to Hacking, the objects of classification in psychiatry (e.g., depressed people, autistic 
children) are constantly reacting and changing in response to how they are classified and the 
classifications for these kinds of people will need to be constantly revised in order to 
accommodate such changes, which in turn will cause further changes in the people so classified. 
This captures the sense in which Hacking wants to suggest that the objects of classification (i.e., 
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kinds of people) in psychiatry and the human science are “moving targets” because of looping 
effects.   
 Several commentators have contested Hacking’s conclusion that the objects of 
classification in the human sciences are not natural kinds because of looping effects (Cooper 
2004; Tsou 2007; cf. Tekin 2014, 2016). Rachel Cooper (2004) argues that Hacking fails to 
establish that the objects classified in the human sciences are sufficiently different from the 
objects of classification in the natural sciences. While Cooper grants the existence of looping 
effects, she argues that the changes that looping effect produce for objects of classification in the 
human sciences are not of greater metaphysical significance than changes that other kinds of 
feedback effects produce for some objects of classification in the natural sciences. For instance, 
due of classificatory practices, the phenotypic traits of domesticated animals can change because 
of the ways that animals are selectively bred, or the use of antibiotics can cause mutations in 
bacteria (Bogen 1988; Khalidi 2010). Hence, Cooper concludes that while looping effects may 
be unique to human science classifications, this should not lead us to think that the objects 
classified in the human sciences are significantly different from the objects classified in the 
natural sciences with respect to the stability of these respective kinds. From a different 
perspective, Tsou (2007) argues that Hacking’s inference from the existence of looping effects to 
the instability of objects of classification in psychiatry is illegitimate. Tsou grants the putative 
existence of looping effects, but denies that the mere presence of looping effects will inevitably 
render objects of classification unstable in the way suggested by Hacking. For example, while 
the experiences and behavior of an individual who is diagnosed with depression will invariably 
be altered by the way that he or she is classified, these changes will not necessarily require 
revisions in the depression classification or changes in what it means to be clinically depressed. 
19 
 
So long as depression can—to a large extent—be identified with a stable set of biological 
properties (e.g., deficient activity of serotonin) that determine a stereotypical set of abnormal 
emotional states (e.g., feelings of sadness, loss of pleasure), depression is a natural kind that 
remains stable in spite of the looping effects of the depression classification (Tsou 2013).    
 Cooper (2005) has offered a somewhat different argument for thinking that the DSM is 
unable to classify natural kinds. Cooper points out that the DSM does not exist in a historical and 
social vacuum and that the DSM has been strongly shaped by social forces. From this 
perspective, Cooper argues that the DSM’s goal of classifying natural kinds has been impeded by 
social and financial factors from the pharmaceutical and medical industries. With respect to the 
pharmaceutical industry, Cooper brings attention to the way that the DSM has been shaped by 
the marketing of particular drug treatments. For instance, some mental disorders (e.g., panic 
disorder, social phobia) have been substantiated through marketing campaigns aimed to show 
that they can be successfully treated by particular drugs. Similarly, she suggests that niche 
marketing of certain mental disorders (e.g., attention deficit hyperactivity disorder) by 
pharmaceutical companies can function to raise the prominence (and prevalence) of a condition, 
thereby helping to establish its legitimacy as a mental disorder. Cooper contends that the medical 
insurance industry presents an even stronger impediment to classifying natural kinds. The 
pervasive influence of this industry arises from the role that the DSM plays in medical insurance 
reimbursement. By the late 1960s, medical insurance carriers in the United States required a 
DSM diagnosis for patients to receive reimbursement for mental health treatment. According to 
Cooper, this created new pressures on the DSM, leading to new disorders (e.g., post-traumatic 
stress disorder) being included in DSM-III as the result of lobbying from certain groups to 
receive reimbursement for treatment (see Young 1995). Because of such social constraints on the 
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DSM, Cooper concludes that the DSM’s goal of classifying natural kinds is unlikely to be 
achieved in practice.  
 
Conclusion: Assessing the DSM 
This chapter focused on two philosophical issues concerning the classification of mental 
disorders: (1) whether a theoretical and causal approach to classification would be superior to the 
purely descriptive approach currently favored by the DSM, and (2) whether the DSM is capable 
of classifying natural kinds. With respect to the first issue, there are good philosophical reasons 
for thinking that the DSM should shift away from its purely descriptive, neo-Kraepelinian stance; 
however, there are also compelling pragmatic reasons for maintaining the DSM’s purely 
descriptive methodology. With respect to the second issue, the DSM’s ideal of classifying 
natural kinds (and formulating valid diagnostic categories) appears to be a reasonable 
philosophical ideal for psychiatric classification; however, there are philosophical and pragmatic 
reasons for thinking that this ideal may be unattainable in practice. 
Returning to the more general issue of assessing the DSM, the DSM’s explicit goals of 
providing a manual that can guide treatment, facilitate research, and improve communication 
appear to be defensible goals. However, as argued in this chapter, the DSM is currently failing to 
substantially achieve these various goals, which can largely be attributed to its failure to provide 
valid diagnostic categories. This raises the question of whether the aims of the DSM ought to be 
defined more narrowly than they currently are, e.g., to provide a manual whose sole purpose is to 
improve communication by providing a common reference point that allows for the exchange of 
information and integration of explanations among various mental health professionals 
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(Kutschenko 2011). Perhaps one of the largest difficulties with the DSM is that it has formulated 
its aims too broadly and its hegemonic status has prevented the serious consideration of 
alternative, more specifically oriented, psychiatric classification systems, e.g., classification 
systems formulated exclusively for treatment (Tsou 2015). As discussed in this chapter, the 
current shape that the DSM has taken—including its aims—has arisen out of contingent 
historical factors. Hence, it may be time to reconsider the goals of the DSM in light of our 
current historical situation and the specific problems that it poses.  
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